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ABSTRACT: I review a tentative list of the examples of ethical (or spiritual) exercises that have been 
proposed as Epictetan by contemporary commentators. Based on a minimal definition of the notion of 
ethical exercises, I suggest that some practices have been misidentified and propose some revisions to 
that repertoire. 
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RESUMO: Analiso, nesse artigo, uma lista de exemplos de exercícios éticos (ou espirituais) que 
foram propostos como epictetianos por comentadores contemporâneos. Baseado numa definição 
mínima da noção de exercícios éticos, sugiro que algumas práticas foram identificadas erroneamente e 
proponho algumas revisões a esse repertório. 
 
RESUMO: Estoicismo romano. Exercícios espirituais. Askesis.  
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On the notion of Ethical Exercises in Epictetus 
1. Introduction: 
 
The extremely complex topic of moral progress in Stoicism can be approached from -at 
least- two different (but complementary) perspectives: a) ethical teaching; b) ethical 
exercises
1
. The first perspective (which has been brilliantly analyzed by Martha Nussbaum
2
) 
concerns the agent who produces (or attempts to produce) a certain change in the the student 
(or, considered from within the analogy philosophy-medicine, the patient), a change that will 
-ideally- get the latter closer to being a fully virtuous individual. The second perspective, 
which is the one I am interested here, concerns the question of what activities (be they 
physical or intellectual) the student can perform himself in order to reach that same goal, and 
does not (necessarily) involve another person: ethical exercises can be initially thought of as 
activities that one should -or, at least, could- perform in isolation. 
Although these practices concern what is frequently labeled -following Foucault- as the 
“care of the self”, ethical exercises only represent a part of the whole range of activities, 
attitudes and dispositions that constitute the general idea of the care of the self (epimeleia), an 
idea which includes -if we consider, for instance, Foucault's broad stroked approach-, the care 
of the body, health regimes, the moderate satisfaction of one's bodily needs, meditation, 
reading, note taking, or conversations with a virtuous person
3
; in other words: every practice 
destined to produce a specific conversion (epistrophē) of the agent. 
With different degrees of specificity, B.L. Hijmans, Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault, 
Richard Sorabji and John Sellars
4
, among others, have approached the general issue of the 
                                               
1Although not much hinges on the issue, I will opt in the following pages for the expression “ethical exercises”, 
rather than Hadot's popular concept of “spiritual exercises”. Hadot's claim that the notion of an “ethical” (or 
moral or intellectual) exercise does not cover all the aspects that he wants to describe (HADOT, 1993, p. 20) is 
understandable if we consider the broad scope of his survey, which ranges from Socrates to Early Christianity. If 
we focus on Roman Stoicism, and on Epictetus in particular, the concept of “ethical exercises” does seem to 
cover, on the contrary, the main idea and focus of the practices we are about to analyze, and has the additional 
advantage of avoiding undesired connotations. Barnes' particular objection to the notion of “spiritual exercises” 
might be seen to derive precisely from such connotations and from the ambiguities present in Hadot's general 
definition of the term. Cf. BARNES (1997, p. 47)  and Sellars' defense of the notion of “spiritual exercise” 
(SELLARS, 2003, p. 111–112). 
2 Cf. NUSSBAUM, 1996. 
3 Cf. FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 58-59.  
4 Cf. FOUCAULT, 1994, 2001; HADOT, 1974, 1995; HIJMANS, 1959; SELLARS, 2003, 2007; SORABJI, 
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care of the soul in Epictetus from different perspectives, without pausing to distinguish, 
nevertheless, what -if anything- sets ethical exercises apart from the rest of the elements that 
constitute the care of the self. Although that approach is undoubtedly more comprehensive 
and allows more far-reaching conclusions, I believe that the question about the specific nature 
and scope of ethical exercises needs to be addressed if we want to reach a fairly systematic 
understanding of Epictetus’ approach to ethics. Although much progress has been made in 
this direction in the last decades, a general vagueness still surrounds the definition of what we 
are to understand by ethical exercises, the consequences of which can be seen in the relative 
confusion in the secondary literature concerning which of Epictetus’ exhortations should 
indeed count as exercises and which of them are merely descriptive accounts of the specific 
features that a virtuous action should have
5
. It could be argued, nevertheless, that Foucault's, 
Hadot's and Sellars' approaches encompass a wider range of elements or perspectives on the 
problem of moral progress, and that any lack of precision on their part in the definition of 
what an ethical exercise is can be linked to that fact. That is, however, precisely what I intend 
to stress: if we rely on the possibility of extracting from Epictetus' lectures certain practices 
or techniques specifically designed to aid the student in his way to virtue, we must be able to 
explicitly distinguish those practices from broader notions such as askēsis or “care the self”. 
Otherwise the notion of an spiritual, moral, intellectual or ethical exercise becomes of little or 
no value at all.  
2.  
Although both the Ench. and the Disc. are filled with terms derived from or equivalent 
to the notion of askēsis (exercise, training), the instances where we find specific practices 
explicitly presented as exercises to be performed by the student are extremely rare. The 
ethical exercises we will be talking about are, thus, practices that we, as readers, reconstruct 
as possible instances of those exercises. Although since Hadot and Foucault's work on the 
notions of “spiritual exercises” and the “care of the self” -respectively-, the literature on Stoic 
exercises has been growing exponentially, a minimal repertoire of the practices that have 
been identified by contemporary commentators as examples of ethical exercises should 
                                                                                                                                                  
2000. 
5 I will return to this point later. 
PROMETEUS – MESTRADO EM FILOSOFIA/ UFS – CÁTEDRA UNESCO ARCHAI 
 
PROMETEUS - Ano 7 - Número 15 – Janeiro-Junho/2014 - E-ISSN: 2176-5960 
128 
include the following: 
e1) To repeat to ourselves certain philosophical (Stoic) theoretical principles or 
maxims
6
.  
e2) To engage in practices of meditation or reflection concerning what happened 
during the day that is ending or what might happen during the day that begins 
(early morning and bedtime reflection)
7
. 
e3) To perform certain activities that allow us to discipline our bodily needs and 
desires
8
. 
e4) To deliberately make a pause before reaching a decision9. 
e5) To adopt a critical attitude towards every impression before making a decision 
(i.e., to be alert or watchful)
10
. 
e6) To evaluate in a thorough and realistic manner the consequences of a certain 
decision before making it
11
. 
e7) To evaluate in a thorough and realistic manner what a certain decision requires of 
us and whether we will be up to those requirements, before making the decision
12
.  
e8) To ask ourselves what a completely virtuous agent (vg. Socrates or Zeno) would 
do when faced with a situation like the one we are faced with
13
. 
e9) To reconsider our situation from a different perspective (relabelling)14. 
e10) To picture in our minds the pleasure we will get from refraining to do certain 
                                               
6 Disc. 1.1.21-25;  2.16.1-4, 3.3.14-16; 4.1.111-113. Cf. [personal reference]. 
7 Disc. 3.10.2-3; 4.6.33-35. Cf.  FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 71–73. On the pythagorean origin of this practice, cf. 
SORABJI, 2000, p. 213–214. 
8 Ench. 47. Cf. FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 68–70; SORABJI, 2000, p. 213–214. 
9 Ench. 34. Cf. SORABJI, 2000, p. 240–241; BARTSCH, 2007, p. 89–95. By “reaching” or “making a 
decision” I am translating -for purely didactic reasons- the technical idea of assenting to a given (practical) 
impression. 
10Disc. 1.20.7-11; 3.12.15; 4.9.16; 4.12. Cf. HIJMANS, 1959, p. 68–70; FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 73–75; 
SELLARS, 2003, p. 141–142.  
11 Ench. 2; 33.13; 34. 
12 Ench. 29. 
13Ench. 33.12. Cf. SELLARS, 2003, p. 141); (HIJMANS, 1959, p. 72–77.  
14Ench. 11; 43; Diss. 1.12.20-21; 4.4.24-6. Cf. SORABJI, 2000, p. 222.  
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actions and the sense of regret we will experience if we perform them
15
. 
e11) To bear in mind the distinction between what does and what does not depend on 
us before making a decision
16
.  
e12) To bear in mind the mortal or ephemeral nature of the object of our desire before 
making a decision
17
. 
e13) To evaluate the situation we are faced with from within its cosmic context18. 
e14) To reflect upon which of the virtues or capacities that we possess (vg.: self-
control -enkrateia-, endurance -karteria-, or patience -anexikakia-) corresponds to 
the specific situation we are faced with
19
.  
e15) To desire things as they actually happen and not as we would like them to 
happen
20
. 
e16) To desire “with reservations” (i.e., qualifying our desires with the clause “if Zeus 
wills”)21. 
e17) To completely suppress our desire until such time has come when we are able to 
experience correct desires
22
. 
e18) To approach our project of moral progress in a progressive manner (i.e., to “begin 
with the little things”)23. 
As is evident, the elements that compose this list are extremely heterogeneous and 
betray diverse philosophical influences. A first general classification, however, can be 
presented concerning two main groups of exercises. The first group [e1-e3] includes certain 
activities that the agent is supposed to perform independently of any particular decision. 
                                               
15Ench. 34. Cf. SEDDON, 2006, p. 132–133; SALLES, 2007, p. 261–262. 
16Disc. 1.24.11-16. Cf. SORABJI, 2000, p. 214–215; SORABJI, 2007, p. 91. 
17Ench. 3. Cf. SORABJI, 2000, p. 216. 
18Disc. 1.13. 
19Ench. 10. Cf. SEDDON, 2006, p. 63–64. 
20Ench. 8. Cf. SELLARS, 2003, p. 136–139; SEDDON, 2006, p. 121–122. INWOOD, 1985, p. 119–126. 
21Ench. 2. Cf. SEDDON, 2006, p. 43–48; SORABJI, 2000, p. 219–220. On the notion of reservation 
(hypexairesis), cf. BRENNAN, 2000; BRUNSCHWIG, 2005; INWOOD, 1985, p. 119–126.  
22Ench. 2; Disc. 1.4.1; 3.22.13. Cf. HIJMANS, 1959, p. 90; SEDDON, 2006, p. 41–42; INWOOD, 1985, p. 
124–125; COOPER, 2007, p. 17. 
23Ench. 12;  Disc. 3.12.12; 4.1.111-115. Cf. HIJMANS, 1959, p. 90; SORABJI, 2000, p. 216. 
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These activities are independent from any particular situation not only from a temporal 
perspective (they can be performed, for instance, every night, regardless of what has 
happened during the day), but also from a conceptual point of view (the practice of 
dedicating a few minutes to meditate what kind of situations we might encounter during the 
day -so as to be prepared for them- is not linked to any specific situation, given that we 
cannot foresee the future). The exercises comprised in this group are consequently of a more 
abstract nature than the ones that conform the second group (e4-e14), in that they are meant 
to prepare us for a wide range of situations (in the case of exercises that project forward) and 
to extract general lessons concerning specific situations that have already taken place
24
 (in the 
case of retrospective exercises)
25
. These exercises possess two additional features that clearly 
define their specificity: firstly, because of their abstract nature, these exercises can be the 
object of a certain planning and organization: I can set myself the goal of evaluating every 
night how far my actions have been from the ideal of virtue, I can dedicate some minutes in 
the morning to picture in my mind what kind of situations I am likely to encounter and what a 
virtuous reaction to them would be, or I can dedicate certain pre-established periods of the 
day to repeat to myself (either by rote or with the aid of a Stoic handbook) certain Stoic 
doctrines that may enable me to make increasingly virtuous decisions. In the second place, 
these exercises are not ends in themselves but rather means to some other goal 
(eudaimonia)
26
: we do not perform morning meditations because of a specific value that that 
practice might have, but merely because it will allow us to face everyday situations in a better 
position than if we didn't perform them.  
The second group of exercises [e4-e14] is constituted by activities that the agent is 
supposed to perform when faced with a particular decision, or when dealing with a general 
                                               
24 If I am, for instance, supposed to recapitulate before going to sleep how I have dealt with certain situations 
during the day, this is not meant to make me experience a sensation of guilt or regret, but rather to enable me to 
learn a particular lesson concerning a kind of situation that I may be faced with in the future once again. 
25 As a matter of fact, many of the exercises can be considered from both perspectives: we can, for instance, 
take the time in the morning to reflect in a general fashion upon the mortal or ephemeral nature of the 
individuals and things we will most likely encounter during the day that begins, or we can reflect upon that 
feature when faced with a specific situation.  
26 An example of this conception of the notion of exercise would be an artisan who practices performing 
hundreds of wooden carvings until he manages to obtain the desired (ideal) result. In this case, the (hundred) 
instances are merely preparatory; they are instances of training and have no value in themselves (as happens 
with the carvings the artisan produces in his preparatory stage). For a careful analysis of the problem of 
philosophy considered as technē or epistēmē, vid. SELLARS, 2003, p. 55–85.  
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complex situation that demands from him a resolution
27
. Besides this general distinctive 
feature, an important difference with the first group is that within this second group we find a 
specific set of exercises (e5-e8, e11-e14) that, unlike e1-e3, should probably not be 
considered as practices that the progressor is supposed to perform in virtue of being a 
progressor but that would later be abandoned: the sage himself performs them, one would 
assume, although in a spontaneous manner
28
. The only difference between the progressor and 
the sage is that the progressor needs to make an active effort to remind himself to perform 
those activities. 
These differences notwithstanding, what is common to both groups of exercises is that 
they can all be minimally defined, in general terms, as certain activities that the agent can 
consciously and voluntarily perform that will enable him to perform future actions in an 
(increasingly) virtuous manner. This definition is evidently vague, since, among other things, 
it leaves out the fact that these exercises are usually of an epistemic nature and it fails to 
include when and how they are supposed to be put into practice. For the time being, however, 
I will take it as a useful definition of an ethical exercise, since it serves to stress two facts: i) 
that ethical exercises are supposed to be concrete activities that the agent engages in, and ii) 
that he does so in a conscious and voluntary manner
29
.  
                                               
27 We might be tempted to state, for the sake of symmetry, that the exercises included in this group are ends in 
themselves, and not merely means to a further end. This could be the case in certain specific exercises, such as 
e6 or e13, where establishing a difference between the exercise and the virtuous action itself seems arbitrary. 
The same cannot be said, however, as regards, vg., e4, e8 or e9, where the exercise is clearly conceived as an 
instrument to reach a virtuous result. 
28 I exclude e9 and e10 from this subset for obvious reasons: the sage does not need, in order to refrain from 
performing certain actions, to picture in his mind the pleasure he will get from so doing, and nor does he need to 
wonder what another sage (be it Socrates, Zeno or Diogenes) would have done in his place. He possesses in 
himself the right criteria and does not need any motivation to pursue the virtuous course of action other than the 
fact that it is the virtuous thing to do. 
29 An additional advantage of the proposed definition is that it downplays the idea that ethical exercises are 
activities directed at a wholesale spiritual conversion of the agent, such as the one proposed by Hadot: “Grâce à 
eux [i.e., ethical exercises] l’individu s’élève à la vie de l’Esprit objectif, c’est-à-dire se replace dans la 
perspective du Tout («S’éterniser en se dépassant»)” (HADOT, 1993, p. 21). To be sure, the aim of ethical 
exercises is indeed to produce an transformation in the psyche of the student, but the emphasis on the notion of 
epistrophē or on the idea that ethical exercises produce “une métamorphose de la personnalité” (HADOT 1993, 
p. 21) has tended to obscure the fact that the transformation in question is of a strictly epistemic nature. Sellars is 
right, nevertheless, to defend Foucault and Hadot's position against Nussbaum's attack, since nowhere do Hadot 
or Foucault suggest that any of the exercises depend on means that are not those of strict rational argumentation, 
nor do they appeal to an irrational part of the soul (cf. (NUSSBAUM 1996, p. 353–354); (SELLARS 2003, p. 
117–118)). My suggestion is, therefore, merely to avoid terms and expressions that might be read as going 
against the actual interpretation one is trying to propose. My rejection of Hadot and Foucault's emphasis on the 
idea of a general epistrophē is also linked to Epictetus' general rejection of the dichotomic picture of Ancient 
Stoicism concerning the figure of the ideal sage and of its counterpart, the complete moral fool: Epictetus' 
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If this an acceptable definition, some progress can be made concerning the goal of 
defining what can and what cannot count as an ethical exercise. If we agree that ethical 
exercises are concrete activities that the agent performs in a voluntary manner, we can filter 
out certain ideas that have been presented by commentators as exercises but which are 
actually either i) descriptions of (some of) the features that an action must have in order to be 
considered as virtuous, or ii) pieces of advice concerning the manner in which we should 
approach the project of moral reform (i.e., beginning with the little things -e18- and 
suppressing our desire until some progress has been made -e17-). Concerning (i), given that 
e15 and e16 are actually descriptions of certain features of a virtuous action, they cannot 
actually function as exercises, since an exercise is precisely a certain practice that will enable 
our actions to have those features, but not the possession of the feature in itself. Concerning 
(ii), those pieces of advice are clearly general guidelines that might apply to certain exercises, 
but are not exercises in themselves. As is evident, this forces us to resign e15-18 and narrow 
down the list of available exercises to e1-e14. By doing so, we have, I believe, cleared the 
way for a more precise understanding of the possibilities of a realistic, useful and more 
accurate reconstruction of Epictetus moral project from a practical perspective. 
3. 
When we consider closely a subset of the second group of exercises, a problem 
immediately arises: if ethical exercises are, according to the minimal definition I proposed 
earlier, concrete activities that the agent consciously and voluntarily performs, what are the 
precise activities we are supposed to perform in the cases of e11-e14? What specific activity 
translates, for instance, Epictetus exhortation to bear in mind the mortal nature of the people 
we love or the distinction between what depends and what does not depend on us?  
                                                                                                                                                  
pedagogical project does not aim directly (as has been stressed, among others, by LONG, 2004, p. 32–33 and 
ROSKAM, 2005, p. 11–124 ) at a complete “metamorphosis of the personality” of the individual, but rather at 
enabling him to, at least, perform particular future actions in an (increasingly) virtuous manner. To be sure, from 
an orthodox Stoic viewpoint, one could object that i) there is no such thing as an increasingly virtuous action 
(an action is virtuous or it is not; there are no possible degrees in that matter), and that ii) in order to perform 
future actions in a virtuous manner, a change of the sort envisaged by Hadot or Foucault must first take place in 
the individual. However, whether or not this jeopardizes the logical consistency of the theory, Epictetus can be 
seen to adopt a more flexible attitude towards both principles, which allows us to not only to speak of an 
increasingly virtuous action but also to assume that Epictetus may not have believed that a wholesome 
epistrophē was needed in order to start performing that kind of actions. 
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In order to see the problem clearly, it is helpful to bear in mind that nearly all the 
exercises of the second group (e6-e14, most clearly) share a common feature: they provide 
the agent with different criteria that will enable him to decide which the virtuous course of 
action is
30
. How this works, nevertheless, is not equal in all the cases: e6-e10 provide us with 
an indirect strategy, i.e., they do not directly provide us with criteria but present us with a rule 
or a strategy we must pursue in order to figure out those criteria ourselves. E11-e14, on the 
other hand, explicitly provide us with specific criteria that we are supposed to make use of 
when faced with a decision. As I have stressed elsewhere, however, whether these different 
criteria are available at the moment of making a decision or not does not depend on an active, 
undetermined (somehow magical) decision. We cannot remind ourselves to bear in mind 
certain criteria: they are either ready at hand (procheiros) or they are not
31
. From Epictetus' 
perspective, we could even say that the very idea of reminding oneself of something 
(anything) is somewhat ludicrous, in that the act of remembering is not an active practice of 
the agent, but rather an event that takes place in the soul (or does not). In his analysis of the 
notion of askēsis in Epictetus, Hijmans claimed on this matter that “many of the exercises in 
Epictetus are announced by the word memnēso, which can be regarded as an almost certain 
signpost that something is to follow that should be used as an exercise by his pupils” 
(HIJMANS, 1959, p. 80). What I suggest is exactly the opposite, to wit, that those statements 
that are preceded by memnēso -or other equivalent formulaic expressions- are rather the 
reverse of ethical exercises: they are instances of ethical teaching. Although it would not 
make sense for Epictetus to urge us to remind ourselves that p, his repeated enunciation of p 
(preceded by the rhetorical device memnēso) aims at increasing the chances that p will be 
                                               
30Although I included above e4 in the first group of exercises by virtue of it also being an activity “that the 
individual consciously and voluntarily performs that will enable him to perform future actions in a (partially) 
virtuous manner”, when we come to this second element of the criteria for a virtuous decision we can consider 
e4 as a necessary -but not sufficient- condition: the student -unlike the sage, presumably- must make a pause 
before making a decision, because it is that period of time that will enable him to factor in all the criteria 
provided by e6-e14. If we place it in the context of the Stoic discussion concerning the passions and whether the 
passing of time alone is enough to cause the heat of a passion to subside or whether a change of a cognitive kind 
is required, Ench. 34 might be seen to incline towards the second alternative: the delay that Epictetus is 
proposing is not just an empty time, but rather a pause dedicated to an intellectual evaluation of the 
consequences of the action, etc.; the necessary condition for the passions to subside -or disappear altogether- is 
not time in itself but a change in our assessment of the situation. 
31 The act of remembering, in any case, can be thought of as the result of certain other activities we have 
performed in the past; but then it is those activities that we can conceive as translatable into exercises (which is 
precisely what e1 and e2 do, i.e., they work on the dynamics of memory or, to put it in contemporary terms, of 
the dynamics of availability). 
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ready at hand when the time comes to make a decision where p is relevant. Epictetus' act of 
reiterating once and again that we should bear in mind certain (Stoic) premises when we are 
about to assent to a certain impression, is not, therefore, an exhortation: it is (or at least it 
aims to be) a pedagogical practice: Epictetus' words will (hopefully) modify the epistemic 
disposition of our soul and make it possible for us to have the correct doctrines ready at hand 
when faced with a decision. 
A quick balance of what we have done so far shows that not only e15-e18 should be 
crossed out as concrete ethical exercises, but also that an important number of what we 
initially identified as the second group of ethical exercises have actually turned out to be not 
ethical exercises in themselves, but rather, considered from a broader perspective, instances 
of ethical teaching (e11-e14). If we accept the narrowed down list of exercises that this 
balance leaves us (which only comprises e1-e10), there does not seem to be anything 
specifically Stoic about Epictetus' therapeutic strategies, at least concerning what the agent is 
supposed to do himself: some of those exercises can be traced backwards to pythagorean 
practices, others are shared by several hellenistic philosophies, and not one of them seems to 
require that we accept any distinctively Stoic premise. All of this notwithstanding, the 
exercises of repetition and meditation (e1 and e2) fit particularly well with the Stoic theory of 
action and with the intellectualist psychology they defend
32
. This explains why repetition and 
meditation turn out to play a much more important part in the process of moral progress than 
one might initially have thought, since they -along with ethical teaching in general- are 
responsible for enabling the several criteria defined by e11-e14 (which includes the most 
important criterion, i.e., the distinction between what does and what does not depend on us) 
to be ready at hand when the time comes to make a virtuous decision. The set of available 
exercises has, all in all, become smaller, but more precise and systematic. 
4. Conclusions 
                                               
32 The same cannot be said as regards e3 (i.e.: to perform certain activities that allow us to discipline our bodily 
needs and desires), since there doesn't seem to be any self-evident reading that would make sense of it from an 
intellectualist account of human agency. A possible solution to the problem that E14 presents might be to 
consider it as rather careless inclusion by Epictetus of a practice that was not only common in any greco-roman 
philosophical circle with ascetic tendencies, but also explicitly endorsed by Epictetus' master Musonius Rufus 
(cf. MUSONIUS RUFUS, Discourses 6). A more plausible solution is probably available; just not not me.  
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In the previous pages, I have attempted to put forward (building mostly on Hadot, 
Foucalt, Sorabji and Sellars' work) a tentative approach to the problem of ethical exercises in 
Epictetus that may, I believe, help to clarify not only the notion of ethical exercises itself but 
also what can count as such, a task which may be considered of interest not only from the 
perspective of the history of philosophy but also on account of the surprising rebirth that the 
interest in Epictetus' ethics is experiencing, specially concerning possible translations of his 
reflexions to concrete therapeutic practices
33
. As is evident, the often defended idea that we 
could read the Ench. as a handbook of practical recipes to reach eudaimonia is simply 
untenable, not only because Epictetus does not present in an explicit manner the practices 
outlined above as exercises, but also because many ideas that might seem at first sight to 
represent concrete exercises are actually not so.  
My specific proposal on this matter has been extremely modest: based on a minimal 
definition of ethical exercises (i.e., activities that the agent consciously and voluntarily 
performs that will enable him to perform future actions in a (partially) virtuous manner), I 
have suggested that of all the examples that have been proposed as ethical exercises by 
commentators, only a portion of them (e1-e10) can be strictly considered to be so. The 
remaining elements of the list cannot be accurately termed exercises because they are either i) 
descriptions of (some of) the features that an action must have in order to be considered as 
virtuous [e15-16], ii) pieces of advice concerning the manner in which we should approach 
the project of moral reform [e17-18], or iii) descriptions of the criteria we must bear in mind 
when deciding on the virtuous course of action [e11-14]. None of these elements seems to be 
translatable into concrete practices that the agent could perform and cannot, as a 
consequence, be easily accommodated within a concrete ethical project. Needless to say, all 
of the ideas outlined in e11-e18 represent an crucial part of Epictetus' general therapeutic and 
pedagogical project, but they are not exercises in themselves, and what my interpretation 
suggests is merely that they should be approached from a different perspective. 
                                               
33 Cf. for instance, the increasing proliferation of editions, translations and free reelaborations of Epictetus' 
Enchiridion that has taken place in the last two decades (cf. ROMANECK, 2007; SEDDON, 2006), or the 
efforts to approach psychological therapy from a cognitive perspective by seeking inspiration in Epictetus' 
general approach to ethics (cf. ROBERTSON, 2010; STILL; DRYDEN, 2003, 2012). 
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This distinction may seem arbitrary and it might even be objected that what I have done 
is mere relabelling: what others have interpreted as ethical exercises would be considered, 
under my interpretation, as part of the global project of the care of the self but not as 
exercises in themselves. The reason why this is not mere relabelling is that only that which 
we can strictly count as an ethical exercise is something we can actually perform in a 
conscious, deliberate and voluntary manner. Conversely, that which cannot be translated into 
a concrete therapeutic practice cannot be said to represent an exercise, unless we deprive the 
notion of ethical exercise of any distinctive hermeneutic value. If we go back to the 
distinction I proposed in the introduction between ethical teaching and ethical exercises, 
which derive their specificity from being what the student can perform himself in order to 
reach the goal of acting in a virtuous manner, I believe that the usefulness of a precise 
definition of what an ethical exercise is becomes self-evident.  
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